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the value of their holdings in these
two firms decline by 80% to 90% as
the common stock price per share
for Freddie dropped from $5.10 to
$0.88 per share and the common
stock price per share for Fannie
dropped from $7.04 to $0.73 per
share. Because short positions effec-
tively increase the number of shares
issued and outstanding, more than
110% of the shares of both Freddie
and Fannie were held by institutions.
Approximately 50% of the shares of
Freddie and Fannie were traded on
Monday, September 8, 2008, follow-
ing the news of the
seizure over the
preceding week-
end. While
many possible
solutions may
be under con-
sideration, one
possible fiscal policy-based answer
may be to simply reduce the depre-
ciable lives for residential real prop-
erty, effectively increasing the net
present value (and, therefore, the
value) of these properties, if held for
trade or business purposes. Some
comparison between a less-recent
historical crisis and the present situ-
ation warrants review.
Change in Fiscal Policy: 
1987 Crash
The Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA81) greatly
accelerated the
depreciation
deductions
available for all
asset classes,
including real prop-
erty, under the accelerat-
ed cost recovery system (ACRS).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86), passed by Congress on
October 22, 1986, provided for an
increase in the depreciable lives of
real property from their ACRS-
based lives of 15 years to a
MACRS-based (modified ACRS)
life of 27.5 years (or longer) while
severely restricting passive activity
losses (PALs). Approximately one
year later, on Monday, October 19,
1987, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average (DJIA) dropped more than
22% in a single trading day. While
there’s no denying that program
trading led the list of contributing
variables to the 1987 stock market
“crash,” another possible causal link
is the extension of depreciable
lives—the move from ACRS to
MACRS—and the imposition of
passive activity loss limitations
(PALs), which together placed
downward pressure on real proper-
ty values as an asset class. These
provisions of TRA86 may have
made economic sense on one
dimension, but they were also likely
to have contributed to the end of
the real estate boom in the early to
mid-1980s as well as to the savings
and loan (S&L) “crisis” and the for-
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On September 8, 2008, Freddie Mac (NYSE: FRE)
and Fannie Mae (NYSE: FNM), the holders of approxi-
mately 50% of mortgages in the United States, were
seized by the U.S. government in a “bailout” that may
cost American taxpayers between $100 billion and 
$300 billion. Effectively, owners of common equity saw 
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mation of the Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC) that followed.
Change in Monetary Policy: 
2008 Crash
The stage was set for the current
housing crisis during the 2002
through 2004 period. Many Ameri-
cans refinanced their existing home
mortgages at lower interest rates,
effectively “cashing in” and consum-
ing much of their equity, but the real
problem arose when no-qualifying
and no-documentation (no-doc)
mortgages were approved by lenders.
In many cases, these were negative
amortization loans for the first few
years of the life of the mortgage
and/or adjustable rate mortgages,
and, as interest rates recovered (June
2004), payments on these mortgages
were reset at higher interest rates
and higher monthly payments. Many
new homeowners, as well as specula-
tors anticipating a continuing rise in
real property values, were unable (or
unwilling) to make these higher pay-
ments as their equity positions evap-
orated. Lenders’ declining collateral
positions in these real properties,
loan defaults, and home foreclosures
grew, increasing the nonperforming
components of lender portfolios of
home mortgage loans. The Mortgage
Forgiveness Debt Relief (MFDR) Act
of 2007 provided some relief to tax-
payers. As real property values
declined and mortgages exceeded the
fair market value of these properties,
financial institutions holding these
nonperforming, or “at risk,” loans
experienced increased shorting and
even naked shorting of their equity
securities. (“Naked shorting” is the
sale of a stock that you don’t own in
anticipation of buying or “covering”
this position at a future date and a
lower price for a profit.) The Securi-
ties & Exchange Commission, the
Federal Reserve, and the Secretary of
the Treasury joined forces to sus-
pend “naked shorting” of Freddie,
Fannie, and 17 other financial insti-
tutions, but the suspension was only
temporary. During the early portion
of the suspension period (July 11,
2008, through July 23, 2008), nearly
one-third of a trillion dollars of
market capitalization recovery
occurred for these financial
institutions.
Stabilizing Residential 
Housing Values and Stimulating
Demand
One of many possible solutions
might include a reduction in the
depreciable lives for residential
housing. Increases in depreciation
expense increase the depreciation
tax shield, after-tax cash flow, and
net present values for long-lived
assets. While this may not solve the
problem for homeowners, the con-
sensus in the business and general
press is that home foreclosures and
mortgage defaults combined with
the increase of these nonperform-
ing loans in lenders’ portfolios sug-
gests that many of those approved
for these troubled loans simply
weren’t economically able to pur-
chase these homes at the time these
mortgages were approved. There-
fore, it appears that an insufficient
number of creditworthy homeown-
ers may be available to absorb the
increased inventory of residential
housing, and the only alternative
may be to provide fiscal policy-
based economic incentives to
investors to absorb the surplus sup-
ply for the near term. Perhaps it’s
merely a question of the “form” of
the bailout: (1) a tax-incentive-
based fiscal policy measure or (2)
direct governmental ownership of
Fannie and Freddie. n
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